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THE CASE FOR A FEMINIST TORTS CASEBOOK
CARL TOBIAS*
Professor Leslie Bender's recent essay, An Overview of Feminist
Torts Scholarship,' contributes substantially to the construction of
feminist perspectives on tort law. She carefully and comprehen-
sively surveys burgeoning feminist scholarship in the field of
torts. Professor Bender closely examines feminist histories of
substantive tort law, the application of feminist theory to tort doc-
trine, to tort law concepts, and to the teaching of torts, tort issues
that are important to women's lives, social science research in-
volving feminism and torts, book reviews that are relevant to fem-
inist tort law, and overviews of material that implicate feminist
viewpoints of torts. 2 After Professor Bender persuasively demon-
strates the breadth and depth of feminist scholarship in the torts
area, she recognizes that considerable work remains to be under-
taken and concludes with a call for feminist torts scholars to re-
double their efforts.
3
Professor Bender specifically urges feminist legal theoreti-
cians to challenge the approach of conventional tort law to fault,
legal responsibility, harm and causation, to translate women's ex-
periences of injury into cognizable causes of action that will com-
pensate women, and to rethink traditional defenses to affirmative
causes of action.4 Professor Bender correspondingly recom-
mends that feminist theoreticians challenge the organizational
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Beth Brennan,
Ban Burke and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and
Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this piece, and the Harris Trust for gener-
ous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine.
1. Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L.
REV. 575 (1993).
2. See id. at 577-95. See generally Paul M. George & Susan McGlamery, Wo-
men and Legal Scholarship: A Bibliography, 77 IOWA L. REv. 87 (1991) (providing
representative bibliography on women and legal scholarship); Symposium, Femi-
nist Jurisprudence and Procedure, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1139 (1993) (providing ideas
similar to those of Professor Bender regarding civil procedure).
3. See Bender, supra note 1, at 595-96. Professor Bender is a prolific femi-
nist torts scholar. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and
Tort, 38J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988) [hereinafter Primer]; Leslie Bender, Changing the
Values in Tort Law, 25 TULSA LJ. 759 (1990).
4. Bender, supra note 1, at 596. See generally Nancy S. Erickson, Final Report:
"Sex Bias in the Teaching of Criminal Law," 42 RUTGERS L. REv. 309, 327-478
(1990) (providing similar suggestions regarding criminal law).
(1517)
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structure of the torts field and tort law's values, create new para-
digms for treating personal injuries, analyze compensation
schemes for evidence of systematic discrimination, and work to
remedy or ameliorate the substantial human costs of physical and
mental harm to individuals in society.5 She also suggests that
practicing attorneys and torts scholars assess litigation strategies
and develop alternatives to dispute resolution (ADR) that protect
vulnerable people and facilitate the prompt disposition of per-
sonal injury lawsuits.6
Professor Bender recommends as well that feminist legal the-
orists reevaluate all of the tort doctrines and the discipline's ana-
lytical concepts to prevent their prejudices involving gender,
class, race and sexuality from being unconsciously reproduced in
the future.7 She asserts that "law schools need torts casebooks
with feminist perspectives, or, at a minimum, books that include
feminist materials." 8 I want to emphasize this insight as a spring-
board for providing a brief, friendly response that seeks to elabo-
rate upon Professor Bender's informative essay.
Professor Bender is absolutely correct in urging that feminist
legal theoreticians apply feminist "insights, methodologies, criti-
ques, and reconstructions" to all of the specific aspects of tort law
that she exhaustively enumerates and to numerous additional fea-
tures of torts. 9 The broad spectrum of doctrinal tort law is illus-
trative. Every substantive area and particular doctrine has its own
history, theory, justification, practice, understanding and applica-
5. Bender, supra note 1, at 596.
6. Id. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-478 (1993) (requiring federal district
courts to experiment with ADR and other measures to facilitate prompt disposi-
tion of civil litigation); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing
the Risk of Prjudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1375-
83 (warning of ADR's dangers for resource-poor individuals); Trina Grillo, The
Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE LJ. 1545 (1991) (warn-
ing of ADR's dangers for women).
7. Bender, supra note 1, at 596. See generally Erickson, supra note 4, at 312-
20 (providing similar ideas regarding criminal law); Judith Resnik, Revising the
Canon: Feminist Help in Teaching Procedure, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 1181 (1993) (provid-
ing similar viewpoints as to civil procedure).
8. Bender, supra note 1, at 596; see also infra note 27 and accompanying text.
See generally Erickson, supra note 4, at 327- 478 (criticizing criminal law casebooks
from feminist perspective); Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analy-
sis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1065 (1985) (criticizing contracts
casebook from feminist perspective); Carl Tobias, Gender Issues and the Prosser,
Wade and Schwartz Torts Casebook, 18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 495 (1988) (explor-
ing gender in torts casebook).
9. Bender, supra note 1, at 575. See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, Gender-
ing and Engendering Process, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1223 (1993) (providing similar
ideas regarding civil procedure).
[Vol. 38: p. 15171518
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tion, each of which feminist reexamination, rethinking and re-
working could improve.
The area of intentional torts warrants reconceptualization in
light of new appreciation that modem intentional torts to persons
frequently involve relationships, such as husband-wife or em-
ployer-employee, in which a male possesses disproportionate
physical power or economic resources that he has used to the det-
riment of a woman. 10 These recent insights have supported the
modification of longstanding tort law rules, such as interspousal
immunity from liability for harm that a husband purposefully in-
flicts upon a wife." The new understandings should concomi-
tantly be applied in recalibrating traditibnal intentional torts to
encompass injuries that employers deliberately perpetrate on em-
ployees in the workplace.' 2
Feminist legal theorists also could contribute substantially to
a reassessment of the important doctrinal area of negligence. For
example, Professor Bender has invoked feminist approaches in
persuasively suggesting that the conventional notion of duty to
rescue be fundamentally recast.' 3 Constructing or rethinking the
10. See, e.g., Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 316 (Tex. 1987) (involving
claim by wife that husband's negligent driving caused wife's injuries); Hardy v.
LaBelle's Distrib. Co., 661 P.2d 35, 36 (Mont. 1983) (involving false imprison-
ment claim by female employee against employer). See generally Daniel Givelber,
The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional In-
fliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 65-75
(1982) (discussing development of intentional infliction of emotional distress as
tort to protect less powerful party in relationship); Tobias, supra note 8, at 509-
19 (analyzing tort scenarios involving relationships in which women traditionally
possessed less power).
11. See, e.g., Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d 1360, 1361 (Fla. 1993) (abrogating
doctrine of interspousal immunity); Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1209
(Miss. 1988) (abandoning common-law concept of interspousal immunity); see
also Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REv. 359, 359-61
(1989) (analyzing interspousal immunity doctrine). See generally Frances E. Ol-
sen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1497, 1530-38 (1983) (examining methods adopted to improve legal status
of women within marital relationship).
12. See Harris v.Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 615-16 (Md. 1977). See generally Re-
gina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 49-56 (1988) (espousing tort action of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress as weapon for remedying employer
abuse of employees); Givelber, supra note 10, at 62-75 (discussing lack of uni-
formity among courts as to specific elements required to assert claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress despite widespread recognition of
intentional infliction of emotional distress as independent tort).
13. See Primer, supra note 3, at 33-36; see also Bender, supra note 1, at 580-81
(challenging "no duty to rescue" doctrine by means of alternative feminist con-
ceptions of human nature). See generally Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revis-
ited: Liberalism, Connection and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1171,
151919931
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specific concept of the reasonable woman in the context of sexual
harassment claims would correspondingly inform application of
the general reasonable person standard in negligence law. 14
When considering the ideas in this paragraph and the one imme-
diately above, it is important to remember that Professor Cathe-
rine MacKinnon has convincingly argued that sexual harassment
should be treated as gender-based discrimination, rather than as a
traditional tort.15
Feminist legal thought also could improve theory and prac-
tice in the products liability area. For instance, several feminist
tort scholars have observed that numerous products, such as the
Dalkon Shield, diethyrstilbestrol (DES), birth control pills,
bendectin and breast implants, which have severely injured
thousands of women, implicate women's reproduction. 16 In-
creased work on these issues might run in a number of directions.
One critical question is why so many products that have seri-
ously hurt women involve their reproduction, the answer to which
could reflect the gender of the individuals whom medical scien-
tists or society thinks should bear the risks of reproductive free-
dom or implicate the concomitant research that these scientists
1228-42 (1992) (evaluating Professor Bender's proposal to recast "no duty to
rescue" doctrine).
14. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopt-
ing reasonable woman standard in sexual harassment civil actions); Andrews v.
City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990) (concluding that sexual
harassment must detrimentally affect reasonable person of same sex as victim);
see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993) (requiring plaintiff
in Title VII sexual harassment claim to establish objectively hostile or abusive
environment as well as subjective perception of abusive environment). See gener-
ally CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979); Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and
the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1197-220 (1989)
(discussing problem of sexual harassment in workplace and proposing elements
of more effective approach to challenging pervasiveness of male-centered
norms); Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman
Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992) (examining use
of reasonable woman standard in context of sexual harassment).
15. See MACKINNON, supra note 14, at 83-90, 158-61.
16. See Tobias, supra note 8, at 500-0 1; see also Lucinda Finley, A Break in the
Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 41, 66-69
(1989) (discussing tort cases involving reproductive issues central to women's
identities); Ellen Smith Pryor, Flawed Promises: A Critical Evaluation of the American
Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 964, 970-73 (1990) (observing that injuries to females resulting in sexual
impairment often have lower settlement value in workers compensation settle-
ment guide published by American Medical Association). See generally Leslie
Bender, Feminist (Re) Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power and
Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE LJ. 848 (criticizing legal system's over-reliance on
economic, cost-based approach regarding mass tort litigation).
1520
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deem worthwhile. Another important issue is how to conceptual-
ize the regulation of products that may endanger women in ways
that reduce the possibility of harm before it happens. For exam-
ple, feminist legal theorists could champion stricter regulation by
calling for greater experimentation with medical devices prior to
Food and Drug Administration approval.
Feminist legal thinkers might correspondingly develop and
suggest better methods of resolving disputes after products have
hurt women.' 7 For instance, additional analysis of mass tort liti-
gation involving the Dalkon Shield, DES, and breast implants18
and of nationwide experimentation with techniques for expedit-
ing federal civil cases' 9 may afford fairer and prompter means of
treating these controversies. This evaluation could also yield im-
proved ways of resolving the lawsuits that are responsive to signif-
icant process values embedded in the litigation, such as enabling
injured women to tell their stories in a public forum. 20 These re-
search efforts in the products liability field will probably show that
current product regulation and extant doctrinal products law,
much less proposals that would reinstitute negligence rather than
strict liability, 2' are insufficiently attentive to the needs of women.
17. See Gina Kolata, Big Cases May End in Small Settlements, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
26, 1993, at E6; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
18. See Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: 4 Proposed
Federal Procedure Act, 64 TEx. L. REv. 1039, 1060-63 (1986). See generally SHELDON
ENGELMAYER & ROBERT WAGMAN, LORD'S JUSTICE (1985) (analyzing Dalkon
Shield litigation); RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE
DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1991) (examining Dalkon Shield litigation).
19. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-478 (1988). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, The
Counter-Reformation in ProceduralJustice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375 (1992) (analyzing
impact of Civil Justice Reform Act on federal judicial and legislative branches);
Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24
ARIZ. ST. .J. 1393 (1992) (arguing that Civil Justice Reform Act is threatening
uniformity and simplicity of federal civil procedure).
20. One important finding that Professor Lucinda Finley made when inter-
viewing DES daughters is the womens' concern that they be able to tell their
stories in open court. Telephone Interview with Professor Lucinda Finley,
SUNY Buffalo, School of Law (Feb. 3, 1993); see also Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the
Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 987-95 (1991) (presenting legal images of
battered women); Joyce McConnell, Incest as Conundrum: Judicial Discourse on Pri-
vate Wrong and Public Harm, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 143, 172 (1992). See generally
Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1466-71
(1987) (book review) (discussing process values).
21. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) and nearly all
American jurisdictions now prescribe strict liability in torts for product liability.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts, could modify this formulation. See James A.
Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1513 (1992); see also Henry
J. Reske, Experts Tackle Torts Restatement, 78 A.B.A. J. 18, 18 (1992) (noting that
§ 402A may be subject to revision by American Law Institute).
19931 1521
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The above ideas only illustrate the many areas of tort law in
which considerable important work remains to be undertaken. In
addition to opening debate and continuing dialogue across the
entire doctrinal field of torts, we need to develop, refine, and
more effectively link the history, theory and practice of tort law; to
integrate and apply feminist legal thought and method; to incor-
porate feminist approaches across the curriculum, particularly in
the first year courses, and throughout the law school environ-
ment; and to undertake much, much more.
Illustrative of most of these phenomena are the Married Wo-
men's Property Acts, the history of which raises gender issues that
faculty and students can productively explore in property, con-
tracts and civil procedure as well as torts.2 2 The examination of
this history also could promote integration of the first year curric-
ulum, combatting the tendency to view these substantive areas as
discrete, compartmentalized units.23 The tort litigation process
concomitantly provides valuable opportunities to consider wo-
men in the civil justice system as judges, lawyers, parties, wit-
nesses and jurors.2 4
In short, we must reexamine, rethink, reorganize, and recon-
ceptualize the field of tort law, essentially revolutionizing how we
conceive of torts. A significant aspect of this worthy, if daunting,
project is the need to unite the numerous disparate strands of tort
law into a more coherent whole. Professor Bender has assembled
and categorized a wealth of informative material that is important
to feminist viewpoints of the tort area. We desperately need an
efficacious means of organizing that sprawling discipline that is
22. See, e.g., RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS IN PROP-
ERTY 254-56, 266-67, 496-503 (1988) (exploring Acts in property); CHARLES L.
KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 585-86 (3d ed. 1993) (exploring Acts in contracts). See generally NORMA
BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAw: WOMEN, MARRIAGE AND PROPERTY IN NINE-
TEENTH CENTURY NEW YORK (1982) (exploring married womens' acts and explor-
ing social and ideological conflict over appropriate role for married women in
economic and political life of nation); Richard H. Chused, Married Womens' Prop-
erly Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359 (1983) (examining development of mar-
ried womens' property acts).
23. See Jay N. Feinman & Marc Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEO. L.J.
875, 900-02 (1985).
24. Cf. Barbara Allen Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights and
Jury Service, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1139, 1160-74 (1993) (providing similar ideas
regarding womens' jury service); Resnik, supra note 7, at 1181-96 (providing
similar ideas regarding civil procedure). See generally Judith Resnik, Naturally
Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682,
1700-21 (1991) (discussing positions in federal court system potentially avail-
able to female candidates).
1522 [Vol. 38: p. 1517
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denominated torts. The overarching theory, the metatheory, if
you will, already exists in the form of feminist legal thought. That
theoretical construct must now be applied systematically to tort
law.
The instrument that is critical to this enterprise is readily
available. That mechanism is the torts casebook, which can be
beneficially employed to revise tort law and to attain other impor-
tant goals, such as infusing the study of torts with gender issues
and feminist legal thought. The development and use of a femi-
nist casebook, therefore, could have felicitous effects beyond unit-
ing and clarifying the tort law field.
The creation and employment of this casebook should illumi-
nate and emphasize gender issues throughout the torts course,
requiring that faculty and students seriously consider questions
that might otherwise remain unexamined. The casebook may
also afford a congenial context for implementing feminist
pedagogy. For instance, these teaching materials, when used with
other techniques, such as small group sessions, collaborative writ-
ing assignments and problem sets that include women, could fos-
ter a classroom learning environment in which female students
feel more comfortable participating.25 The development of, and
reliance on, a feminist casebook also may encourage more faculty
and students to view gender issues and feminist approaches as
institutionalized aspects of torts and of the broader law school
curriculum and experience, thus increasing their legitimacy.
We have instructive models, such as the monumental effort
of Professor Henry Hart and Professor Herbert Wechsler, The
Federal Courts and the Federal System, a casebook that substantially
contributed to conceptualizing and elucidating the enormous,
complex field of federal courts. 26 Feminist torts theorists ought
25. See Catherine Weiss & LQuise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Wo-
men, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1356-59 (1988); Stephanie M. Wildman, The Question
of Silence: Techniques to Ensure Full Class Participation, 38J. LEGAL ED. 147 (1988);
cf. Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 38J. LEGAL ED. 137, 151-54
(1988) (concluding that law professors must become more sensitive to language
used and images conveyed in classroom). This treatment is obviously not in-
tended to exhaust the issue of womens' participation or the broader area of fem-
inist pedagogy. A number of the remaining articles in the symposium, Women in
Legal Education - Pedagogy, Law, Theory and Practice, 38 J. LEGAL ED. 1 (1988), are
applicable. See generally Feinman & Feldman, supra note 23 (proposing alternate
approach to teaching basic courses in first year of law school).
26. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973); see also ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & DON-
ALD T. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS: CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CONFLICTS OF LAws (1965) (analyzing multistate conflicts of law using tradi-
tional principles of legal analysis, which helped to organize field).
1993] 1523
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to draw on these exemplars in reconceiving torts. For instance,
the scholars might initially formulate an effective organizational
structure. They could then assemble and classify the scattered
shards of tort law as constituents of the organic whole. The crea-
tion of this organizational framework also should facilitate the
identification of gaps that require additional work and the
designation of areas that warrant refinement. Once feminist theo-
reticians have completed these activities, they can begin integrat-
ing all of the pertinent information.
The casebook is the linchpin for reconceptualizing and unit-
ing the sprawling field of tort law. Professor Bender has supplied
many of the diverse threads. Quite significant to the development
of a feminist torts casebook is ProfessorJean Love's early effort to
gather and organize relevant opinions and materials that could be
employed in teaching torts from a feminist perspective.2 7 This
work should be integral to the larger project that I contemplate.
The expansion of Professor Love's endeavor, in conjunction with
the collection, categorization and organization of the material
that Professor Bender has reviewed, should provide the founda-
tion for constructing a more substantial edifice.
Since Professor Bender published her essay, feminist legal
scholars have agreed to undertake a project similar to the one
that I am suggesting.28 Approximately twenty theoreticians have
decided to develop a nontraditional torts casebook and have con-
tacted a major law book publisher about the prospect. The par-
ticipants are planning to depart in several important ways from
the approaches that most existing casebooks in the field employ.
The group will probably rely on a format that differs signifi-
cantly from conventional casebooks that emphasize the elements
of affirmative causes of action and defenses for the major catego-
ries of intentional, negligent and strict liability torts.2 9 The new
materials would correspondingly include fewer appellate opin-
27. See Jean C. Love, Teaching Torts: A New Perspective - Selected Cases
and Articles Uan. 1987) (unpublished maAuscript) (copy on file with author); see
also Bender, supra note 1, at 595 (suggesting feminist approach to teaching moral
theory in context of tort law classes). A few casebooks include some feminist
materials. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 398-400, 429
(1993); HAROLD LuNTz & DAVID HAMBLY, TORTS: CASES AND COMMENTARY (3d
ed. 1992). But see Tobias, supra note 8 (criticizing treatment of women and gen-
der issues in widely used torts casebook).
28. I rely substantially here on Telephone Interviews with Professor
Phoebe Haddon, Temple University, School of Law (Nov. 5, 1993), and Profes-
sorJoan Vogel, Vermont Law School (Nov. 10, 1993).
29. See DOBBS, supra note 27, at 21-712; WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 18-809 (8th ed. 1988).
[Vol. 38: p. 15171524
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ions and more secondary information, such as excerpts from law
review articles and empirical data demonstrating, for instance, the
high incidence of spousal rape.30 Moreover, the casebook may
well incorporate numerous critiques, radical and otherwise, of
traditional tort law and might even explore alternatives to con-
ventional notions of compensating injuries with monetary dam-
ages.3 1 Finally, the authors are planning not only to apply
feminist legal.theory and method to tort law, but also to stress
issues important to torts that involve race, class, and sexual
orientation.3 2
The feminist scholars have issued a call seeking additional
expressions of interest, support and ideas. The group has held
several preliminary meetings to implement an organizational
structure and to discuss effective ways of proceeding. The partici-
pants have agreed on an initial organizational scheme. A few
individuals will be on the "front-line" of organizing, conceptual-
izing, and writing, and the remainder will provide support by, for
example, compiling relevant sources and reading background ma-
terial. The comparatively mundane tasks of allocating responsi-
bilities for planning the project have not been particularly
controversial.
Additional aspects of the undertaking have sparked lively in-
tellectual debate and healthy exchange among the participants.
Illustrative have been the discussions of the appropriate balance
between the theoretical and practical treatment of tort law with
some scholars preferring a more abstract approach and others ad-
vocating a comparatively pragmatic examination. The group
members have apparently disagreed, and may continue to differ,
over fundamentals, such as format, coverage, and how dramati-
cally to depart from traditional presentations of tort law. Indeed,
one of the most challenging features of the project may be trans-
lating the extraordinary promise of feminist legal thought into the
reality of a feminist torts casebook.
The new effort to create the casebook is invaluable, and all
30. See Maria L. Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and the Force of
Law, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1657 (1981); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights
and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 642-48
(1986).
31. See Richard L. Abel, Torts, in THE POLITiCS OF LAw 326-49 (rev. ed.
1990); Morton J. Horwitz, The Doctrine f Objective Causation, in id. at 360-86; see
also Bender, supra note 1, at 584-86 (discussing alternative tort remedies for inju-
ries suffered by women).
32. The material in this paragraph is very tentative and is primarily pre-
mised on the conversation with Professor Vogel, supra note 28.
1993] 1525
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legal educators interested in feminist legal theory and practice
should do everything possible to ensure its successful completion.
This worthy endeavor and my suggestions may be incomplete,
and both could encounter obstacles, experience missteps or lead
to errors. The need for a feminist torts casebook, the possibility
of better comprehending the field, and the benefits of integrating
feminist legal thought into torts that the effort represents, how-
ever, are too great to delay any longer the attempt.
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